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Criminal Law and Procedure. State v. Parrillo, 228 A.3d 613
(R.I. 2020). A trial justice has the ability in a criminal, jury-waived
trial to clarify theories of liability, disregard far-fetched testimony,
and draw reasonable inferences from testimony and circumstantial
evidence. Per the raise-or-waive rule, if a defendant has concerns
regarding a trial justice’s impartiality, these concerns must be
raised at the trial court level in order to preserve the issue on
appeal.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In December 2011, complainants, Jacob Fernandes
(Fernandes) and his wife, Sumiya Majeed (Majeed), were assaulted
by bouncers and the owner of Club 295 in Providence.1 The incident
unfolded when Majeed needed to use the restroom and Paul Vargas
(Vargas), the husband of one of Majeed’s coworkers who was
familiar with the layout of Club 295, pointed Majeed to the
restroom.2 At Majeed’s request, Fernandes met her at the restroom
to hold the door closed as it could not be secured from the inside.3
Vargas, who testified at trial, said that after pointing Majeed to the
restroom he noticed one of the bouncers of the club (Tomas
Robinson, principal assailant) putting Fernandes in a chokehold
and pulling him toward the patio of the club with Majeed following.4
The owner of the club, Anthony Parrillo (Defendant), instructed the
bouncers to take Fernandes outside saying, “[n]ot right now.
There’s too many people. We will get him later.”5 Once outside,
two bouncers pinned Fernandes’s arms behind his back and
repeatedly hit Fernandes in the face, head, and body while the
Defendant held Majeed back from intervening.6 Fernandes fell to
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

State v. Parrillo, 228 A.3d 613, 615 (R.I. 2020).
Id. at 616.
Id.
Id. at 617.
Id. at 619.
Id. at 618.
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the ground and Majeed freed herself from Defendant and fell on top
of him to cover him while both bouncers continued to kick the
couple.7 Fernandes suffered serious injuries, including an orbital
fracture and dental injuries that required hospitalization and
surgery.8
Detective Michael Otrando of the Providence Police
Department obtained a formal written statement from Vargas
detailing the event, showed Fernandes an array of photographs in
which Fernandes identified the Defendant as one of the individuals
involved in the assault, and later conducted a formal recorded
interview of the Defendant.9 Detective Otrando concluded that the
Defendant took part in the assault on Majeed and conspired with
others to assault Fernandes and, “according to evidence, [the
Defendant] was present [at the scene] and directing his
employees.”10
A criminal information was filed against the Defendant in
Providence County Superior Court, charging him with conspiracy
(which was later dismissed),11 one count of felony assault upon
Fernandes, and one count of simple assault upon Majeed.12 The
defendant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty and then waived
his right to a jury trial.13 Trial commenced on April 28, 2015.14 The
Defendant moved to dismiss after the State rested its case, citing
insufficient evidence to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, and a hearing on this motion to dismiss was held on May 7
and 8, 2015.15 On November 2, 2015, the court heard arguments

7. Id.
8. Id. at 615.
9. Id. at 618–19.
10. Id. at 619.
11. Id. at 620 (Defendant’s motion to dismiss the conspiracy count was
granted as the trial justice determined that standing alone, the plea of Tomas
Robinson, a bouncer and principal assailant, did not establish a conspiracy).
12. Id. at 616, 619 n.11 (detailing the merger of count one, felony assault
upon Fernandes, with serious injury resulting, and count two, assault upon
Fernandes with a dangerous weapon into one charge, felony assault, as the two
charges were part of the same continuing transaction).
13. Id. at 616.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 619–21 (the trial justice denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss
the felony assault and simple assault counts but allowed Defendant to reargue
the issue of dismissal as an error of law).
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on Defendant’s remaining charges of felony assault with serious
bodily injury on Fernandes and simple assault on Majeed, and
again, Defendant moved to dismiss.16
In regard to Defendant’s simple assault charge upon Majeed,
the Defendant called William DeQuattro (DeQuattro), who was
friends with Defendant and at the club the evening of the incident,
to testify at the trial.17 DeQuattro testified that Defendant held
Majeed, not to hold her back from her husband, but to comfort her.18
In light of DeQuattro’s testimony, Defendant argued that the trial
justice would be inappropriately pyramiding inferences if they
found Defendant was holding back Majeed to prevent the violence
against her husband as there were two equally justifiable
inferences that could be drawn, and when there is an inference of
guilt and an inference of innocence, an inference in favor of
innocence must be drawn.19 The trial justice was not persuaded by
Defendant’s arguments regarding the inappropriate pyramiding of
inferences and found that given her husband was being beaten,
Majeed was not being voluntarily held back and there was enough
evidence for the court to find the Defendant as a principal in a
simple assault on Majeed.20
Further, in regard to the simple assault charge, the State also
noted that the charge was sustained under a theory of aiding and
abetting, which was included in the criminal information and
pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws section 11-1-3.21 When the
trial justice inquired as to whether the State was arguing aiding
and abetting in regard to the other counts, the State said they did
not believe they had the ability to do so as Defendant was not
charged under the aforementioned statute in regard to the other
counts.22 The court gave the State a brief recess before it made
final arguments on whether the aiding and abetting statute could
be applied to Defendant in regard to the other counts as it was not

16. Id. at 622.
17. Id. at 621.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 622.
20. Id. at 622–23 (the State, however, argued that the totality of circumstances pointed to the fact that the Defendant held Majeed while her husband
was beaten by Defendant’s employees to prevent her from interfering).
21. Id. at 619–20 (citing 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-1-3 (1956)).
22. Id. at 619.
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specifically cited in the criminal information.23 After the recess,
the State also argued aiding and abetting in regard to the other
charges, stating that in order to use the theory, it need not be set
forth in the criminal information and does not require proof of an
additional element.24 Defendant argued that advancing an aiding
and abetting theory was prejudicial.25
The trial justice determined that the State advancing the
theory of aiding and abetting did not constitute a new charge, was
not prejudicial, and as such, the trial justice would consider the
aiding and abetting theory for the felony assault charge.26 Further,
the Defendant was afforded an opportunity after he rested his case
to call witnesses to alleviate any perceived prejudice relating to the
State’s advancement of the aiding and abetting theory later in the
trial, but Defendant did not present any witnesses.27 Under the
theory of aiding and abetting, the trial justice denied to dismiss the
felony assault charge as there was a “community of unlawful
purpose” and Defendant shared in the intent to inflict serious bodily
injury on Fernandes.28
Defendant also argued that had he known he would need to
defend against an aiding and abetting theory, he may not have
chosen to waive his right to a jury trial.29 However, the trial justice
noted that there was an extensive conversation on record with the
Defendant that the ultimate decision regarding a jury trial
belonged to the Defendant.30
In a bench decision, the trial justice ultimately found
Defendant guilty as to both the felony assault and simple assault
counts and denied Defendant’s renewed motion to dismiss,
sentencing Defendant to fifteen years of imprisonment.31

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 620.
Id. at 620 (citing State v. Davis, 877 A.2d 642, 648 (R.I. 2005)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 621.
Id.
Id. at 622.
Id.
Id. at 623.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Defendant appealed, advancing four different arguments and
the Rhode Island Supreme Court conducted a de novo review of the
trial justice’s conclusions of law.32
The Defendant’s first argument, was that he was deprived of
his right to trial by a neutral and detached arbiter, contending that
the trial justice coached the State to pursue an aiding and abetting
theory.33 The Court rejected this argument as Defendant did not
question the trial justice’s impartiality when it was appropriate to
do so.34 Because Defendant knowingly waived his right to a jury
trial, Defendant should have raised his concerns around the trial
justice’s impartiality when the issue of aiding and abetting arose.35
Additionally, Defendant was encouraged by the trial justice to
research the issue of aiding and abetting when the trial justice
granted the State a short recess to research the State’s uncertainty
of pursuing the theory.36 If the Defendant had wanted to preserve
the issue of the trial justice’s impartiality for appeal, the Defendant
should have made a motion requesting the trial justice recuse
himself after the theory of aiding and abetting was advanced.37
Because Defendant did not question the trial justice’s impartiality
at the appropriate time, pursuant to the raise-or-waive rule,38 the
Defendant did not preserve this issue and could not raise an
objection or advance a new theory on appeal that was not raised at
the trial court.39
In Defendant’s second argument, he contended that his
conviction should be vacated as the pyramiding of inferences made
from the State’s circumstantial evidence was speculative and as
such, there was insufficient evidence to establish guilt beyond a
32. Id. (quoting Hernandez v. JS Pallet Co., 41 A.3d 978, 982 (R.I. 2012)).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 624.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 624–25 (citing State v. Howard, 23 A.3d 1133, 1137–38 (R.I.
2011)).
38. The raise-or-waive rule requires “a specific objection to preserve an issue for appeal.” Id. at 625 (citation omitted). The Court requires “a specific
objection so that the allegation of error can be brought to the attention of the
trial justice, who will then have an opportunity to rule on it.” Id. (quoting State
v. Pona, 66 A.3d 454, 468 (R.I. 2013)).
39. Id.
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reasonable doubt on both convictions.40 However, the Court
clarified that the State does not have to disprove every possible
inference of innocence, “as long as the totality of the circumstantial
evidence offered constitutes proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.”41 Further, the Court explained that the pyramiding of
inferences becomes speculative only when the initial inference in
the pyramid rests upon an ambiguous fact that is equally capable
of supporting guilt or innocence.42
Specifically, Defendant
contended that based on DeQuattro’s testimony it could be equally
inferred that Defendant was holding Majeed to comfort and protect
her, and thus, it was improper of the trial justice to infer that
Defendant was holding Majeed to prevent her from getting to her
husband.43 The Court disagreed with Defendant’s argument
stating that DeQuattro’s testimony was so inconsistent with
testimony given by other witnesses as to border on being
far-fetched, and as such, the trial justice was not wrong in his
evaluation of the evidence in the case.44 Additionally, the Court
determined the trial justice did not err as to an initial inference as
the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence at trial
was consistent with guilt: Defendant ordered his employees to take
Fernandes to the location where the assault escalated and
Defendant’s restraint of Majeed after directing his employees to
take Fernandes to the back of the club was only consistent with the
inference that he held Majeed to prevent her from interfering.45 As
such, the Court determined that based on the evidence there was
nothing speculative about the inferences drawn by the trial
justice.46
The Defendant’s third argument on appeal was that he was
prejudiced by the lack of notice of the “charge” of aiding and
abetting in regard to the felony assault charge and had there been
timely notice, he may not have waived his right to a jury trial and
may have conducted his cross-examination of the State’s witnesses

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id. at 626 (quoting State v. Caruolo, 524 A.2d 575, 581 (R.I. 1987)).
Id. (citing Caruolo, 524 A.2d at 582).
Id. at 627.
Id. at 628.
Id.
Id.
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differently.47 The Court rejected this argument as there was an
extensive conversation with the trial justice that established that
Defendant understood it was his decision, not his counsel’s, to waive
a jury trial.48 Additionally, Defendant did not raise the issue of jury
waiver until two months after the aiding and abetting theory was
introduced.49 Further, the Court clarified that aiding and abetting
is a theory of liability—not a separate charge or offense.50 Per
State v. Davis, “one who aids and abets in the commission of a crime
and is also present at the scene may be charged and convicted as a
principal.”51
As such, Defendant’s argument that he was
prejudiced by the separate “charge” of aiding and abetting is
incorrect.52 Additionally, the Court noted that the Defendant could
have sought a bill of particulars to clarify the State’s theories of
guilt.53 Accordingly, the Court rejected Defendant’s argument
regarding the prejudicial effect of the State’s aiding and abetting
theory.54
Lastly, the Court addressed Defendant’s final argument, that
if none of the errors standing alone warrants reversal, the
cumulative effect of the errors leads to reversible error, and thus,
his conviction should be overturned.55 The Court dismissed this
argument because the trial justice’s rulings were not erroneous, and
therefore, the cumulative effect doctrine was not available to
Defendant.56 As such, the Court rejected Defendant’s appeal and
affirmed the judgement of the Superior Court.57
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court reinforced the importance of
timing during the trial court process in mitigating potential

47. Id. at 629.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 629–30.
51. Id. at 630 (quoting State v. Davis, 877 A.2d 642, 648 (R.I. 2005)).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 630–31 (in his argument, Defendant relied on State v. Pepper,
237 A.2d 330 (R.I. 1968)).
56. Id. at 631.
57. Id.
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prejudice and preserving a defendant’s arguments on appeal. The
Court acknowledged that, in the absence of clear error, trial justices
have the power to inquire about theories of liability as well as
possess the ultimate discretion in the admission and weight of
evidence in a jury-waived trial.
The Court discussed that because the Defendant did not raise
the concern of the trial justice’s impartiality at the trial court level,
thus preserving the issue for appeal, that the Court would abide by
the “staunchly adhered” to raise-or-waive rule.58 In applying the
raise-or-waive rule, the Court reinforced the purpose of the rule in
maintaining judicial efficiency by preventing parties, like the
Defendant, from litigating issues on appeal that could and should
have been addressed at the trial court level. While the raise-orwaive rule recognizes exceptions for constitutional or novel areas of
law, straying from this rule in cases such as this, where an
exception is not established, could lead to continuous appeals that
would overwhelm appellate courts and weaken the importance of
the trial court process.
Further, the Court reinforced the trial justice’s ability in a
criminal case to evaluate evidence and determine inferences based
on a totality of the circumstances. A trial justice in a criminal case
does not act erroneously when they do not accept implausible
evidence or testimony that is inconsistent with guilt, as an
inference that a defendant is innocent. This also prevents the
prosecution from the arduous process of disproving every possible
far-fetched inference.
The Court’s acknowledgement that
extremely implausible testimony does not disturb the trial justice’s
ability to make appropriate inferences furthers the important
purpose of judicial effectiveness and efficiency. Were the trial
justice to give equal weight to every possible inference of far-fetched
testimony, a defendant could potentially call any witness willing to
testify that the defendant acted inconsistently with guilt and the
trial justice would have to dismiss the charge or, through the
appeals process, the case would have to be reversed. Given the
potential harm that forcing trial justices to make improbable
inferences would have on the integrity of the criminal justice
process, the Court importantly recognized that a trial justice does
not engage in an inappropriate pyramiding of inferences by
58. Id. at 623, 625.
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disregarding absurd testimony and weighing the totality of
evidence.
Lastly, the Court also clarified that aiding and abetting is not
a separate charge, but a theory of liability under Rhode Island law,
and a defendant is not prejudiced by the introduction of this theory
in a criminal, jury-waived trial.59 Perhaps more importantly, the
Court acknowledged the ability of defendants to mitigate the
possible surprise of defending against an aiding and abetting theory
through requesting a bill of particulars.60 In acknowledging
Defendant’s ability to utilize judicial tools available to him at the
trial court level, the Court echoed the importance of zealously
engaging in the trial court process to encourage the diligence of
counsel and promote the efficiency of the criminal justice system as
a whole.
CONCLUSION

In holding that in order to preserve the issue of a trial justice’s
impartiality for appeal, a defendant must raise this concern at the
trial court level, the Rhode Island Supreme Court strongly
recognized the importance of criminal defendants utilizing the trial
court process efficiently. Further, aiding and abetting is a theory
of liability, not a separate charge, and an improper pyramiding of
inferences is not established by a trial justice’s decision to disregard
far-fetched witness testimony.
The Court’s decision further
established the autonomy of trial justices in drawing inferences and
clarifying theories as well as the importance of using the trial court
process efficiently to preserve future issues for appeal.
Sheya Rivard

59. Id. at 629–30; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-1-3 (1956).
60. Id. at 630.

